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Zusammenfassung 
Der Beitrag untersucht die Beziehung zwischen Privatsphäre und Zivilgesellschaft in 
historischer Perspektive. Als Fallbeispiele dienen die neuere Geschichte der 
Datenschutzgesetzgebung im Allgemeinen und die Entwicklung in der Schweiz seit 
den 1970er Jahren im Besonderen. Die Argumentation vertritt einen 
interaktionistischen Ansatz. Die begriffliche Unterscheidung zwischen den Bereichen 
Privatsphäre, Zivilgesellschaft und Staat soll nicht dazu verleiten, die Interaktionen 
und Interdependenzen zwischen diesen Sektoren zu übersehen. Der Schutz der 
Privatsphäre soll vielmehr als Voraussetzung für soziale Gerechtigkeit und Gleichheit 
und damit als grundlegend für die Entwicklung der Zivilgesellschaft verstanden 
werden. Der erste Teil des Beitrags diskutiert unterschiedliche Definitionen für die 
Beziehung zwischen Privatsphäre und Öffentlichkeit und stellt zwei widersprüchliche 
Definitionsversuche der neueren Literatur gegenüber. Im zweiten Teil werden die 
verschiedenen Stufen der Datenschutzgesetzgebung seit den 1970er Jahren, im 
europäischen Rahmen, zusammengefasst. Es wird gezeigt, wie der rechtliche Begriff 
der Privatsphäre in den letzten Jahrzehnten von einem individualistischen zu einem 
sozialen Konzept umdefiniert und erweitert wurde. Der dritte Teil untersucht die 
neueren Datenschutzgesetze in der Schweiz und zeigt, dass der Schutz der 
Privatsphäre in der politischen Diskussion auch als Garantie bürgerlicher Rechte und 
als Schutz vor ungerechter Diskriminierung verstanden wurde. In der Konklusion 
werden schließlich die Folgerungen diskutiert, die aus der Fallstudie für das 
Verständnis der Beziehung zwischen Zivilgesellschaft, Privatsphäre und Staat zu 
ziehen sind. 
 
Abstract 
The paper examines the relation between the realms of privacy and civil society by 
analyzing the recent history of privacy legislation in general and the developments in 
Switzerland since the 1970s in particular. It argues that the conceptual distinction 
between the spheres of privacy, civil society and the state should not entice to ignore 
the interactions and interdependencies between these spheres. Instead, the 
protection of privacy should be understood as a precondition for social justice and 
equality and thus as fundamental for the development of a civil society. The first part 
of the paper deals with definitions for the relation between the private and the public, 
juxtaposing two contradicting definitions prevalent in the literature. The second part 
resumes the different stages of legislation in data protection since the 1970s, mainly 
in the European context, pointing out how the legal concept of privacy has been 
redefined over the past decades, from an individualistic to a social concept. The third 
part examines the recent privacy legislation in Switzerland and shows that the 
protection of privacy, for which the institutions of the government played an important 
role, sums up to the protection of basic civil rights, as the protection from unjust 
discrimination. The conclusion discusses the implications of the case study for 
understanding the relation between the realms of privacy, civil society and the state. 
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This paper investigates the relation between the realms of privacy and civil society by 
analyzing the recent history of privacy legislation in general and the developments in 
Switzerland since the 1970s in particular.1 The paper argues that the distinction 
between the spheres of privacy, civil society and the state that underlies most 
definitions of civil society should not entice to ignore the important interactions and 
interdependencies between these separate spheres. By analyzing how privacy 
debates interact with the area of the civil society, the paper argues that the protection 
of privacy should be understood as a precondition for social justice and equality and 
thus as fundamental for the development of a civil society.  
The first part of the paper deals with conceptual issues, notably definitions for the 
relation between the private and the public, as the basis of the concepts of privacy 
and civil society. I will juxtapose two contradicting definitions for the relation between 
privacy and civil society prevalent in the civil society literature. Following one of these 
definitions, the private-public relation will be understood as interactive and co-
evolutionary. The stages and effects of this co-evolution will be illustrated in the 
second and the third parts of the paper. The second part resumes the different 
stages of legislation in data protection since the 1970s, mainly in the European 
context, pointing out how the legal concept of privacy has been redefined over the 
past decades, from an individualistic to a social concept. This development illustrates 
the enhanced inter-dependence between the protection of privacy and the growth of 
civil society. The third part examines the recent privacy legislation in Switzerland and 
shows that the protection of privacy, for which the institutions of the government 
played an important role, sums up to the protection of basic civil rights, as the 
protection from unjust discrimination. Thus, privacy legislation can be seen as a 
protection of social values like social justice or social equality. In this sense, the 
protection of privacy serves as a precondition for the development of a civil society. 
The conclusion discusses the implications of the case study for understanding the 
relation between the realms of privacy, civil society and the state. 
1. The relation between the private sphere and civil society: two 
interpretations 
Definitions of civil society usually distinguish civil society from the state and the 
market sector on the one hand and from the private sphere on the other. In this 
sense, civil society is usually defined by pointing at its borders with other parts of 
society (Gosewinkel 2003; Gosewinkel & Reichardt 2004). This definition includes an 
                                            
1 The research for this paper was funded by the A.v.Humboldt-Foundation, Bad Godesberg. For 
helpful comments, I would like to thank Dieter Gosewinkel, Sabine Maasen and the participants of the 
"Civil Society Working Group" at the Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).  
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institutional and a practical argument. Institutionally, civil society is marked by non-
governmental, non-profit, associative institutions (the "third sector"), set against the 
institutions of the state and those of the private sphere like the family. Civil society is 
also characterized by its own logic of action that, in the words of John Keane, tends 
to be "non-violent, self-organizing and self-reflexive", against for example the 
individual conduct of personal affairs within the private sphere (Keane 1998: 6; also: 
Cohen & Arato 1992: 15-26, 180ff.). Most authors take a similar stand as Jürgen 
Kocka, arguing that the relationship between civil society, the state and the private 
sphere is ambivalent: partly contradictive and full of tensions, partly interactive and 
cross-fertilizing (Kocka 2000: 22-26; Kocka 2004).  
Most of these definitions, particularly in the literature on the third sector, focus on the 
tensions and the conflicts of civil society with the government or with market 
organizations (Priller & Zimmer 2001; Priller 2002; Randeria 2003). The relation 
between civil society and the private sphere however is less studied. Although the 
Habermasian distinction between the public and the private sphere lies at the core of 
most current concepts of civil society (Keane 1998: 160ff.), the analysis of the 
interaction between the private and the public is usually restricted to work in gender 
studies, namely its critique of the modern distinction between the public and the 
private (for example: Landes 1998; Rössler 2001: 187ff.).  
Recent debates however about the protection of privacy, under the threats of the 
modern information technology or the political threats of the current rise in terrorism, 
have lead to an increased interest in the relation between privacy and civil society. In 
particular, we can distinguish two opposing interpretations for the relation between 
the two spheres: a contradictive and a cross-fertilizing interpretation. The first 
interpretation, represented for example by communitarian approaches, is based on a 
contradictive understanding of the two spheres. Amitai Etzioni for example 
understands the relation between privacy and civil society as one of irreconcilability. 
In his book on the "Limits of Privacy" (1999), he argues that the recent legislation for 
the protection of privacy poses a danger for the values of civil society. Based upon a 
series of case studies like forced HIV testing of pregnant women or the public 
"outing" of sex offenders, Etzioni maintains that the protection of privacy in recent 
years increasingly contradicted the needs and values of the civil society, as he 
understands it in his communitarian approach. He is particularly critical with the 
privacy debates in America and detects a pro-privacy bias in contemporary society, 
illustrated for example by the 1973 decision of the Supreme Court to accept the right 
of abortion on the ground of the privacy of the pregnant women (Etzioni 1999: 192ff.). 
He is also concerned with the rising power of state authorities over the civil society 
and concludes that "the best way to curtail the need for governmental control and 
intrusion is to have somewhat less privacy", combined of course with extended self-
regulatory authorities of communities (Etzioni 1999: 213f.). For his radically 
communitarian approach, the values of the civil society have to prevail over the 
interests of individuals. "Communitarians (...) hold that important social formulations 
of the good can be left to private choices - provided there is sufficient communal 
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scrutiny!" As the community relies on the fostering of "prosocial conduct" by 
communal recognition and censure, it also requires "the scrutiny of some behaviour, 
not by police or secret agents, but by friends, neighbors, and fellow members of 
voluntary associations." (Etzioni 1999: 213).  
Although, Etzioni represents a radical position within the civil society literature, the 
notion of some contradictive tension between civil society and the private sphere is 
nearly common sense. Following a Habermasian account, the dominant view of the 
literature is that the historic constitution of the public sphere and the realm of civil 
society depended on the parallel constitution of the modern concept of privacy. 
Whereas Etzioni's approach sees the two realms as irreconcilable, the Habermasian 
tradition understands the tension as a cross-fertilizing relation. Keane for example, 
based upon Habermas' thesis of the transformation of the public sphere, argues that 
the process of modernization included a differentiation of society into relatively 
independent subsystems. For Keane (following Habermas) the public sphere, and 
with it the realm of the bourgeois civil society, originated from the bourgeois 
opposition to the aristocratic governments of the Ancien régime. The same 
opposition also inspired the bourgeois concept of the private sphere of individuals 
and families (Keane 1998: 158-163; Habermas 1990: 225ff.). Thus, since the late-
eighteenth-century, civil society gradually separated itself from state authorities. The 
constitution of the public sphere and the rise of the private sphere are seen as 
simultaneous and closely related transformations. The nineteenth century is thus 
marked by the "polarization of the social and the intimate sphere", after which the 
public and the private spheres emerged as two interdependent sectors of the 
bourgeois society. As a result of this, civil society today is built upon its own logic of 
action, "permanently in tension with (…) the state institutions that 'frame', constrict 
and enable (its) activities" (Keane 1998: 6, 158-163; Habermas 1990: 225ff., 238-
247; similarly: Weintraub 1997: 15f.; Kocka 2002). Keane understands the 
contemporary relation between the public and the private as increasingly 
contradictive. He suggests that the contemporary rise of civil society and the 
politicization of the public sphere lead to the disappearance of the realm of privacy as 
is harder today to justify any action as a private matter (Keane 1998: 183). 
The cross-fertilizing interpretation understands the relation between the private and 
the civil society sphere as interactive or even co-dependent. This line of argument is 
particularly common in feminist research questioning the opposition between private 
and public spheres since the 1970s (Weintaub 1997: 27-34). Jean Cohen for 
example, in her work on the abortion controversy in the U.S., maintains that privacy 
rights are not in opposition to the values of a democratic civil society - rather the 
opposite. "Privacy rights are meant to ensure certain domains of decisional autonomy 
to every individual, not an atomist or voluntarist conception of the individual. They 
protect one's decisional autonomy vis-à-vis certain crucially personal concerns, they 
do not dictate the kinds of reasons one gives for decisions or the reflective processes 
informing the decisions." (Cohen 1992: 97). Cohen understands the concept of 
privacy not as a seclusive but as a decisional term - as the right of individuals to 
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choose in what form they want to be part of the larger society. In this sense, privacy 
becomes a precondition for the plurality of the civil society. "What, if not a right to 
personal privacy (securing control over access and decision making to the 
individual), protects the variety of identities of individuals and groups living in modern 
civil societies from levelling in the name of some vague idea of community values or 
the majority's conception of the common good?" (Cohen 1997: 153). The German 
philosopher Beate Rössler has taken a similar stand. She distinguishes three 
dimensions of privacy: a local dimension, illustrated by the private home, an 
informational dimension, based around the intimate and personal information about 
individuals, and a decisional dimension, which she also refers to the abortion debate. 
Although she understands the links between the private and the public as ambivalent 
and dissonant, Rössler's basic argument remains that the protection of privacy allows 
citizens to lead an autonomous life and therefore serves as a precondition for the 
liberty of a liberal society (Rössler 2001: 39f. 144ff., 201ff., 255ff.).  
In a more general sense, the history of the family, a paradigmatic institution of the 
private sphere, has been used as an example to show that civil society partly 
depends on the values of the private sphere. Jeff Weintraub for example, following 
Philippe Ariès' "History of Private Life", argues that the "private realm of domesticity" 
is not a realm of isolated individuals or of individualism. He understands the private 
sphere rather as a precondition for social interactions on the level of civil society. "On 
the contrary, the family is (to a greater or lesser extent) a collective unit, constituted 
by particularistic ties of attachment, affection, and obligation; and the modern family 
has characteristically been understood - and idealized - precisely as a refuge against 
the self-interested individualism and impersonality of civil society." (Weintraub 1997: 
18f.) Anthony Giddens, in his work on the transformation of intimacy, has also 
analyzed the changing notion of intimacy in the second half of the 20th century and 
stresses that intimate spheres, like the family or other forms of partnership and 
friendship, were influenced by feminist and gay movements and thus gradually 
democratized over the past decades. In Giddens' view, this transformation of 
intimacy strengthened values such as the liberal autonomy of individuals or the 
pluralism of society in general (Giddens 1992: 184-190).   
From a historian's perspective, Gunilla-Friederike Budde has taken a similar line of 
argument. Examining the social and political activities of bourgeois women in the 
19th century, Budde claims that the political activities of women were not separated 
from the family but depended upon family networks and relations of kinship. The 
family acted as a testing ground where female actors seized the opportunity to 
practice a "culture of civility" ("Kultur der Zivilität"; Budde 2003: 72f.). Thus, Budde 
transforms the institution of the bourgeois family from a private institution into an 
agency for the civil society. This is only possible as Budde's concept of civil society 
refers to a particular mode of agency, not to fixed social spaces or spheres, which 
allows her to build a bridge between the privacy of the family and public areas of 19th 
century societies and to examine the interactive, cross-fertilizing processes.  
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The example of the family is a reminder that the differentiation of modern societies 
into distinct sectors or sub-systems had an ambivalent effect. On the one side the 
emergence of separate social sectors also constituted separate logics of action 
according to the sectors. But the differentiation also increased the tension and the 
need for coordination between the different sectors. It is helpful to borrow from a 
model of Peter Weingart, with which he recently tried to analyze the tensions 
between the sub-systems of politics and science in current debates about food and 
health risks. Weingart's model is based upon Niklas Luhmann’s system theory, 
particularly upon the notion of a structural coupling (“strukturelle Koppelung”) 
between separate social sub-systems. Following Luhmann’s model, Weingart 
assumes both, a process of social differentiation leading to separate social sectors 
and increasing processes (and problems) of co-dependency and coupling between 
the sectors (Luhmann 1977; Weingart 2001: 13f., 127f.). Such a model helps to 
explain the seeming contradiction between the formation of separate social sectors, 
for example the polarization between the private and the public in the 19th century, 
and the persisting and often conflictive cross-fertilization processes between the 
sectors. We will get back to this system theory perspective in the concluding part of 
this paper.  
2. Towards a social conception of privacy: the transformation of 
privacy in recent legislation  
Apart from studies in gender history, our understanding of the relation between the 
realms of privacy and civil society remains sketchy (see also the contributions to: 
Weintraub 1997). The following case study intends to historicize the notion of privacy 
and its relation to civil society. It specifies the public-private relation by drawing on 
the recent history of legislation in data protection and the changing legal notions of 
privacy. The case shows that as an effect of the legal debates the concept of privacy 
changed from an individualist to a social concept, thus also increasing the inter-
dependence between the realms of the private and the public, not least by giving rise 
to a variety of civil society activism around the protection of privacy.  
Privacy, understood as the protection of the private sphere and of the personal 
integrity of individuals, is a fundamental civil right of modern democracies with a long 
tradition. Already before 1800, notions of privacy and secrecy were incorporated into 
the behavioural codes of certain trades and professions. The trade secrecy of 
merchants for example, the professional secrecy of lawyers, the medical secrecy of 
physicians or the confessional secrecy of priests - they were all precursors for 
contemporary regulations of privacy and data protection (Moore 1984: 285-288). The 
classic definition, upon which most modern privacy legislation is based, goes back to 
the 1880s and to legal debates in the U.S. about the intrusion of early tabloid 
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journalism into the private life of celebrities. Among the most influential statements 
for the legal protection of privacy was an article of Louis Brandeis and Samuel 
Warren, two American lawyers, published in the Harvard Law Review. Under the title 
of "The Right to Privacy", the article demanded that in a liberal democracy the privacy 
of citizens should be legally protected as a core civil right. Famously, Brandeis and 
Warren defined privacy as the "right to be left alone" (Brandeis & Warren 1890).  
This classic definition refers to a liberal or individualistic notion of privacy as an area 
of human activity secluded from the public sphere and protected from the inspection 
of outsiders. In his seminal book on "Regulating Privacy", political scientist Colin 
Bennett also deals with this traditional concept of privacy calling it the humanistic 
dimension of the concept that is based upon the dignity, individuality, integrity and 
personality of individuals (Bennett 1992: 22ff.). This liberal approach also shaped the 
academic interest in the analysis of privacy. Until the 1970s, privacy has mainly been 
studied in legal terms, whereas in social sciences it was only of marginal interest 
(Westin 1967: XI). One of the rare exceptions is Georg Simmel's study on the social 
meaning of secrets (Simmel 1908). The missing interest had a simple reason. 
Following the liberal tradition, the concept of privacy was opposed to the social 
worlds of community, politics and publicity (for example: Moore 1984: 267f.). As the 
"right to be left alone" and in opposition to the realm of society, privacy was thus an 
anathema for social sciences.  
This changed with the arrival of modern information technologies, notably the rise of 
the computer since the 1960s. Since the arrival of the first computers in the mid-
sixties, the private sphere of citizens and consumers has been repeatedly threatened 
by waves of technological innovations: from the first central business computers in 
the 1960s over the success of the personal computer in the 1980s to the arrival of 
the internet in the 1990s. Technological challenges were followed by successive 
waves of legislation, starting in Europe with the first legislation in the German state of 
Hessen in 1970, and in America with the Privacy Act of 1974 (Rotenberg 1999). The 
close co-development between technological threats and legislative responses is 
mirrored by the term "data protection" (in German "Datenschutz") under which most 
European privacy laws were signed (Mayer-Schönberger 1997). Against this 
background, the ongoing controversies over how to protect privacy after September 
11, 2001, are just the last stage of a confrontation between technological opportu-
nities of control and surveillance and the assertion of privacy as a central civil right of 
the emerging information society.  
In this legislative process, the concept of privacy changed its meaning with the 
debates around data protection. The spread of information and communication tech-
nologies since the 1960s challenged the traditional legal framework with its 
individualistic notion of privacy. As an effect of this, privacy debates changed in two 
important ways. First, the concept of privacy was redefined from an individualistic to a 
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social concept, and second, the debates around the protection of privacy formed the 
nucleus around which several new social movements emerged.  
How did the meaning of privacy change on a conceptual level? The opportunities of 
information technologies to collect, exchange, distribute and network personal data 
undermined the dichotomy between the public and the private, and thus the liberal 
concept of the personal sphere (Lyon & Zureik 1996: 13). Since the late 1960s, many 
institutions of the state and the private economy, like the insurance or the banking 
industry, took advantage of the opportunities of the computer technology and began 
to build new databases or make their existing ones more effective. Public concerns 
about the lacking democratic control over these databases – with the dystopia of an 
Orwellian 1984 – were behind most of the modern privacy laws since the 1970s. The 
first wave of legislation primarily addressed the data management of government 
authorities. The USA introduced its Privacy Act already in 1974 with a liberal, 
decentralized system of public control. The Privacy Act lacked a central authority for 
the oversight of data protection and was rather built upon the principle of 
decentralized self-regulation, granting the main responsibility for securing privacy to 
codes of fair information practices, and, in cases of misconduct, to the initiative of 
citizens and the power of the court system (Bennett 1992: 198-200). European 
countries took a more interventionist stand, often stipulating independent supervisory 
authorities for controlling the compliance with data protection legislation, since the 
1980s increasingly also in the private sector (Flaherty 1989: 406). Since the 1980s, 
most European countries introduced watchdog authorities, in Germany the 
"Bundesbeauftragter für Datenschutz", in Switzerland the national 
"Datenschutzbeauftragter", in France the "Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et 
des Libertés" (the CNIL), in Britain the "Data Protection Registrar" (Bennett 1992: 
196f.; Sauter 1995: 44ff., 71ff., 165ff.).  
Crucially, modern privacy legislation since the 1970s did not try to prohibit mass 
collections of personal data. The protection of personal data was not an issue of 
seclusion anymore, or of how to hide data. Instead, it became a matter of how to 
design appropriate guidelines for the management and distribution of personal data. 
Often in current debates on the protection of privacy, the question is not anymore 
how to prohibit personal data from being disclosed but how to build more democratic 
forms of data management. Specifically, the networking of large databases and the 
decentralized management of mass data over the internet faces the problem of how 
to build participatory forms of management and access to these databases (Agre 
1997; Mayer-Schönberger 1997: 232f.; Bowker & Star 1999: 316f.).  
Modern privacy legislation is therefore characterized by principles for the adequate 
management of personal data by government authorities and private corporations. 
These principles included the right of informational self-determination by the data 
subject, meaning that the data collecting authority was only allowed to collect, 
manage and distribute personal data with the agreement of the person giving his or 
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her personal data (the so called principle of 'informed consent'; Flaherty 1989: 7). In 
the late sixties, Alan Westin, a professor of public law at Columbia University, was 
among the first to rephrase a new concept of privacy more appropriate to the 
technological developments. Whereas in the liberal tradition, privacy was defined in 
negative terms (no intrusion, no violation of the private sphere), Westin formulated a 
positive and sociological definition of privacy as "the claim of individuals, groups, or 
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information 
about them is communicated to others" (Westin 1967: 7). Thus, with the spread of 
information technologies, privacy has been transformed from the negative right "to be 
left alone" to the positive right of what is now commonly called the right of 
"informational self-determination" (Flaherty 1989: 7). Germany for example officially 
introduced the principle of informational self-determination after a ruling of the federal 
constitutional court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) in 1984.  
Today, the right of informational self-determination is included in most privacy 
legislation and is seen as one of the new civil rights of the emerging information 
society (Rotenberg 1998: 8ff.). David Lyon and Elia Zureik conclude that similar to 
information as a truly social entity, privacy has become a social value (Lyon & Zureik 
1996: 13). And Colin Bennett argues that the humanistic dimension of privacy, as 
mentioned above, has been gradually replaced by a political and instrumental notion 
of privacy. Political, because with the threats of computer technologies, privacy has 
become a barrier against technological surveillance and thus a prerequisite of a 
pluralistic democracy. And instrumental as the regulation of data management can 
today been achieved by the regulation of privacy. Thus, privacy has become a social 
issue. In this sense, the intention of recent privacy legislation to regulate the 
institutional management and social distribution of personal data differs 
fundamentally from the traditional privacy legislation that secured that personal data 
remained completely hidden from outsiders' access.  
The social concept of privacy shows that today the distinction between the private 
and the public sphere is not as clear cut anymore as it was with the liberal concept of 
the private sphere in the late 19th century. Under the current technologically 
advanced circumstances, the private sphere is not separated but always already 
entangled with the public sphere. Private information is not safeguarded anymore in 
the hands or one individual on in the pages of a diary anymore. Rather, it is 
constituted, managed and stored in a social environment. Private information and the 
protection of privacy have become socially and politically administered issues. The 
question is not anymore where to draw the line between the private and the public, 
but how to prevent that the social and political administration of private information 
can be organized to prevent discriminatory uses of personal information.  
The concept of privacy did not only change on a conceptual level, the issue of 
privacy also began to appeal to new social groups. Whereas the traditional concept 
was defined as the right of individual citizens, the rise of information technologies 
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newly confronted specific groups with the erosion of their privacy, for example 
consumers, hospitalized patients or holders of insurance policies. Privacy became 
the concern of several special interest groups, from left-wing political activists to 
consumers' rights organizations. In Germany for example, the governments' census 
project in 1981-83 sparked a grass-roots movement opposing the handing out of 
personal data to the state. The census was termed an intrusion into the private 
sphere and an infliction of civil rights. The movement was particularly strong among 
alternative and civil rights groups but also included a conservative opposition 
suspicious of a big government approach that it saw behind the project. This broad 
coalition of civil society groups organized a boycott (the "Volkszählungsboykott") that 
eventually brought down the project. In 1984 the federal constitutional court ruled in 
the landmark sentence, mentioned above, that the census project had to oblige the 
principles of privacy and data protection, in particular the principle of informational 
self-determination. In the aftermath of this sentence, the government changed the 
system of censuses, replacing the large macro-census (questioning the whole 
population) by a system of multiple representative micro-censuses (Pfetsch 1986; 
Kühnel 1993).  
Germany was not the only country in which the public and political debates around 
the protection of privacy sparked a movement on the civil society level. In Australia, 
the plans of the government to introduce an identity card in 1987 was equally met by 
a popular opposition, which first led to a crisis of the government before the ID-
project was eventually dropped. Also in the US and in Britain, similar projects for a 
national identity card have repeatedly been blocked by popular opposition, most 
recently in Britain in 2001, after the terrorist attacks of September 11 (Davies 1997: 
145-149; Flaherty 1989: 45ff.). Also, the spread of the internet in the 1990s was 
followed by a mushrooming of privacy activism (for example the Electronic Privacy 
Information Center: www.epic.org). Finally, as data confidentiality can now be seen 
as an economic good, the protection of privacy has also become part of a customer-
friendly business strategy (Bennett 1992: 31-35). Simon Davies, an Australian 
researcher and director of "Privacy International", even argued that the changing con-
cerns of consumers mirror a broader transformation of the status of privacy. With the 
new technical opportunities for private corporations to manage personal data (data 
warehousing, data mining, etc), privacy is currently being transformed from a civil 
right of citizens into a commodity of consumers (Davies 1997: 145, 156ff.). 
Thus, since the 1970s, the main political actors for the protection of privacy were 
organizations of the civil society. Paradoxically, an issue of the private sphere led to 
increased activities on the level of the civil society, because both, individuals and 
organizations of the civil society felt threatened by their common enemy, the alleged 
technological superiority of the "surveillance state". 
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3. Privacy, justice and equality: privacy legislation in 
Switzerland since the 1970s 
But also in another sense, the protection of privacy is linked to the conditions of a 
civil society. Privacy legislation aims at the protection of personal data from misuse 
through institutions like the government or private firms. In practice, this amounts to 
the ban of a discriminatory use of certain personal data of individuals. In other words: 
Privacy protection aims at treating individuals as equal persons, disregarding some 
of their individual differences, which are designated as private and irrelevant for the 
public. Thus, the protection of privacy is a precondition for social justice in the public 
sphere, allowing individuals to act as equals. To illustrate this, I will briefly discuss the 
implementation of privacy legislation in Switzerland since the 1970s. 
This case study is also a reminder for the changing institutional context of the 
regulation of privacy. Today the problem of government surveillance that dominated 
the debates of the 1970s and 1980s is mainly replaced by the critique of the way 
businesses and corporations deal with privacy. Under these changed circumstances, 
government authorities, particularly those concerned with the implementation and 
supervision over privacy legislation, have become allies for the protection of privacy 
against business and market interests. Thus, it is misleading to oppose the privacy 
interests of individuals against the interests of governments, as for example in the 
traditional critique of the surveillance power of government authorities. The Swiss 
case is marked by the determined opposition of the private sector against the 
introduction of privacy legislation and is therefore a telling example for the shifting 
alliances between privacy advocates (individuals or associations), government 
authorities and business organizations.  
Privacy legislation in Switzerland was generally inspired by legislation in other 
European countries and organizations on the European level. Although Switzerland 
was neither part of the European Economic Community nor later of the European 
Union, it was still a member in other European and international organizations, such 
as the Council of Europe or the OECD. Therefore, Swiss legislation closely followed 
the deliberations of international and European organizations since the late 1970s, 
particularly the Convention for data protection of the Council of Europe in 1980 and 
later the Directive of the European Union after 1995 (Schweizer 1999: 37; Brun 1999; 
from the perspective of international organizations: Bennett 1992: 130-140).  
After 1980 several international organisations, in which Switzerland was an active 
member, came out with the first generation of regulation on data protection, notably 
in 1980 the OECD with its Privacy Guidelines, and one year later the Council of 
Europe with its Convention on Privacy (Brainbridge 1996: 15-18; Bennett 1992: 133-
140). This Convention had an immediate effect on Swiss legislation by setting off a 
ratification process and a public debate on the protection of privacy (Nabholz 1993: 
1f.). The Swiss government appointed a commission to work out the proposal for a 
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national law for data protection. One of its sub-commissions particularly focused on 
the protection of medical data in the life insurance market (EJPD 1984: 1-7).  
The private sector, particularly the banking and insurance industries, fiercely 
opposed the proposed law. Apart from their general opposition to public 
interventionism, the insurance industry feared that they would have to change their 
practices of managing customers' data. Most controversial was one particular data 
base, maintained by the professional association of life insurance companies. This 
"Association of Swiss Life Insurance Companies", established in 1891, was not only 
an institution for political and cartelistic coordination, it also acted as the host of a 
centralized database into which all associated companies were asked to contribute at 
least the names of all applicants and policy holders with so-called "substandard 
risks". The term of substandard risks refers to a traditional distinction of the insurance 
industry between normal or standard applicants to be insured with normal contracts 
and applicants with physical or other ailments either to be excluded from insurance 
contracts or to insured with a surcharge on the premium. The definition of 
substandard risks included mainly chronic illnesses with a high mortality risk: 
tuberculosis, cancer, syphilis, diabetes, or heart diseases, but also mental illnesses 
or disabilities (Stévenin 1968). 
The centralized database was formally called the "Notification Pool for Abnormal 
Risks" ("Mitteilungsverband für abnormale Risiken"). The data in the "Notification 
Pool" was accessible to any company associated, but hidden from the knowledge of 
the customers. As soon as an insurance company was approached by a new 
applicant, the insurance checked the records of the notification pool, usually without 
telling the applicant about the inquiry. If the applicant was registered as an "abnormal 
risk", the company would either turn the application down or grant a restricted policy 
only. Usually, the applicants would not learn what led to the insurance's decision. The 
hope of the association of life insurers was that its notification pool would prevent 
customers with substandard risks from cheating the insurance company by hiding 
their illnesses. Often, the data that the insurance companies delivered for the 
centralized database included not only the applicant's name and the decision of the 
insurance, but also information on the reasons for the decisions or even the complete 
medical record of the applicant (Archives Zurich Insurance: Q 123 204: 42417, 
documents of 19 April 1994; 3 May 1994). 
The notification pool was practically undisputed until the 1980s, presumably because 
hardly anybody outside the insurance industry knew about it. In 1984 the government 
commission destined to work out a data protection law started to examine the 
insurance industry and soon found out about the notification system. The commission 
openly criticized the practice in its published report as discriminatory, pointing out 
that building up an information pool without the knowledge and consent of the people 
affected was presumably illegal. The reported claimed that the insurers should at 
least inform the applicants about the pool and ask for permission to check it (EJPD 
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1984: 122-124). The report stirred a public controversy in which the insurance 
industry was widely criticised for the unjust practices around its secret database (for 
example in the TV consumer's program "Kassensturz", in a report by Irene Loebell, 
Schweizer Fernsehen DRS, 17 September 1984).  
The controversy about the notification system was just one element of the larger 
debate about the data protection law. As the commission finished their work with a 
proposal for a data protection law, the insurance industry, assisted by the banking 
sector and the national chamber of commerce, tried to prevent the legislation (Neue 
Zürcher Zeitung, 9.11.1984, section "Inland"; similarly for other European countries: 
Pearce & Platten 1998: 535). In its consultation report, the Swiss Insurance 
Association dismissed the proposal as a "fundamentally flawed" and a "monstrous" 
law (Archives Zurich Insurance: Q 123 204: 30492, letter of 18 Sept. 1984). They 
argued for a leaner version of the law that would not be applicable to the private 
sector at all. Eventually, the combined opposition of banks and insurances 
succeeded in bringing down the proposition during the parliamentary debates. 
After this failure, it took another eight years until in 1993 the political authorities 
succeeded with a revised proposal for a data protection law. The second attempt was 
successful not because the financial sector suddenly changed its mind but because 
the political context for privacy concerns fundamentally changed after 1989. 
Generally, with the end of the cold war government intelligence services, particularly 
those spying on their own population, lost most of their political legitimacy that was 
built upon the political antagonisms of the cold war period. Switzerland was 
particularly hit as a parliamentary commission revealed that during the cold war the 
secret service of the government (the "Staatsschutz") had built up and managed a 
secret database with files on 900'000 persons, mostly Swiss citizens. In the public 
and political reaction this practice was unanimously seen as undemocratic and 
scandalous. Several grassroots organizations successfully launched a referendum 
for the partial abolishment of the secret service. Eventually in 1998, the proposition 
failed in the vote, but only after the secret service was profoundly reorganized. As an 
indirect effect of the scandal, the advocates and parties favouring a strong data 
protection law gained enough public support to bring together a parliamentary 
coalition in favour of the proposed legislation (Lempen 1995: 75-82). Under these 
circumstances, the insurance industry stopped its fundamental opposition and 
argued instead for a weaker version of the law. In the end, the proposal accepted by 
the parliament included a compromise. The new office for data protection was 
smaller than in the original proposal, but the law still applied for both the public and 
the private sector (Nabholz 1993; Schweitzer 1993). In the end, the power of the 
financial services industry was able to delay but not to prevent a data protection 
legislation that also applied for the private sector. Still, their opposition was the 
reason why Switzerland was among the latest western European countries to 
legislate its data protection.  
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The law of 1992 was also the end of the notification pool of the private insurance 
industry. After the introduction of the law, the legal departments of major insurers 
became sceptical about the legality of the notification system of the Association of 
Life Insurances. By collecting, storing and using personal data without the consent of 
the data subject, the practice was at least in contradiction to the right of informational 
self-determination. Apparently, in the last years of its existence, the system did not 
work properly anyway. Some major insurance companies reduced the amount of 
notifications in a significant manner, and some insiders already questioned the value 
of the information pool. Finally, one of the market leaders, the "Winterthur Life" pulled 
out of the system, causing a domino effect. As two other major insurers, the "Swiss 
Life" and the "Zurich" joined the first drop out, the whole notification system 
collapsed.  
The centralized system of the notification pool was replaced with a decentralized 
system of data bases managed by each insurance company. Nowadays, information 
on physical ailments is still regularly checked before signing an insurance contract. 
The crucial difference between the old and the new system is the compliance with 
the principle of informational self-determination. All storage and use of personal data 
is based upon the approval of the data subject, who is asked to sign a respective 
declaration with his or her contract. In this new procedure, the applicant is 
theoretically free to grant or refuse the authorization for further uses of his or her 
personal data (Winterthur 2000). But obviously, applicants are acting under 
constraint – if they refuse the signature, they will not get the insurance contract 
applied for. Thus basically, the notification pool is still in existence, only that contract 
holders now know that their personal data can be disclosed to other insurance 
companies.  
This change from a hidden to a visible and approved notification pool can be seen as 
an indicator for an increasing self-governance of individuals within a modern 
“insurance society”, in the way that François Ewald has argued it in his “L’État 
Providence” (1986). In Ewald’s view, insurance institutions, namely within developed 
Welfare states, changed modern society fundamentally into an “insurance society” 
(“société assurantielle”). Insurance practices are seen as new “disciplinary” 
techniques (Ewald, 1986, pp. 1-15, 381-384). Ewald's study is only the most 
prominent example of a group of works that apply Foucault’s concept of 
“governmentality” to the topic of insurance. The concept of governmentality points at 
new ways of modern state government, based upon the administration of the bodies 
and minds of the subjects – stressing the important link between the power of state 
authorities and the subjectification of individuals. With this concept, Foucault and 
others also aimed at displacing a state-focused concept of power with the idea of a 
plurality of governing institutions and with their respective technologies of power 
(Foucault, 1982, 1991; Dean, 1999; Knights & Vurdubakis, 1993). The case of the 
notification pool illustrates that not only the Welfare state with its public social 
insurances but also the private insurance system is marked by the development of a 
modern, insurance-related “governmentality” (Lengwiler 2003).  
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The case is also an illustration for a general tendency in the recent history of privacy 
legislation. In the 1970s and 1980s, most legislation focused on the data collections 
of government authorities, following the criticisms of the surveillance powers of 
governments (Bennett 1997: 103; Bennett 1992; Flaherty 1989). The main 
instruments of early privacy laws were public authorities, partly within the government 
administration, partly semi-independent, like ombudsmen for data protection or 
privacy watchdogs. Their main task was to control government practices and act as 
an address for complaints of citizens (Bennett 1992: 158-161). In recent years 
however, the focus of privacy legislation has shifted from state institutions to 
organizations of the private economy. The public sector is now adequately controlled 
by central regulations and by supervision of independent institutions whereas the 
private sector often still counts on the force of self-regulations, like fair-information 
practices and codes of conduct (Rothenberg 1998). Even in countries like 
Switzerland, where since 1995 the data protection law applies to both sectors, the 
implementation of legal regulations in the private sector faces serious problems. For 
example, the Swiss Deputy for Data Protection (the "Eidgenössische 
Datenschutzbeauftragter"), the main independent privacy watchdog, often struggles 
to get the appropriate information on data management practices in private 
companies possibly inflicting privacy legislation (Tätigkeitsbericht 1994/95: section 
6.2.; Tätigkeitsbericht 1998/99, section 7.12.). Consumers are faced with the similar 
difficulty that they often don't even know how their personal data is being used by 
private companies (Schweizer 2001).  
In this situation, the interest of individuals and groups for the protection of their 
privacy matched with the goal of government authorities set up for the 
implementation of privacy legislation. The tension between privacy activists and 
government authorities, that still marked the 1970s and 1980s (Davies 1997: 145, 
156ff.), has been replaced by a pragmatic alliance between the two groups - an 
alliance built upon the joint opposition against the power of institutions of the private 
economy.  
The case of the "notification pool" of the Swiss insurance industry also points at the 
significance of the protection of privacy for the civil society. In this typical case, the 
protection of privacy prevents the misuse of personal data for discriminative practices 
as the exclusion of individuals from access to insurance without their knowledge. The 
data stored in the notification pool are typical for that sort of private information that is 
protected by privacy legislation: information about an individual's state of health, his 
or her personal biography or current personal habits. Generally speaking, the 
protection of privacy aims at making differences on the private, personal level 
irrelevant for assessments and decisions in the public or the economic sphere. In 
other words: the protection of privacy is a mechanism to suppress the use of 
discriminatory information in situations where it is deemed illegitimate. It is a 
mechanism to force institutions and organizations to treat individuals as equal and in 
a just way, disregarding their personal differences. In this sense, the protection of 
privacy can be seen as a condition for social justice and social equality. If we follow 
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Jürgen Kocka in defining civil society as a type of non-conflictive, peaceful social 
action recognizing "plurality, difference and tension" (Kocka 2004: 69), the protection 
of privacy becomes a central prerequisite for the organization of the civil society.  
4. Conclusion 
The case study of recent legislation for the protection of privacy points out two 
characteristics of the relation between civil society and the private sphere: the 
significance of the private sphere as a precondition for civil society and other 
important cross-fertilizing processes between the private and the public sphere. 
1. The development of privacy legislation shows that the privacy and its protection is 
a precondition for social justice and equality and therefore for a pluralistic civil 
society. The history of data protection, notably since the 1970s, has witnessed a 
fundamental change in the definition of privacy. The traditional negative, 
individualistic meaning of the term, in the sense of the "right to be left alone", has 
gradually been replaced by a more positive, social meaning of privacy: as the right of 
"informational self-determination". In other words, the individual has the civil right to 
determine the way his or her personal information is used in different social contexts. 
Privacy has become the privileged norm for responsible use of personal information 
by corporations and government authorities. Today, privacy is seen as a modality of 
socially responsible interactions among informational subjects of the information age. 
In this sense, the institution of privacy rights does not lead to an atomistic but rather 
to a pluralistic society. This conclusion joins the related argument of Giddens, Cohen 
or Rössler mentioned above. Giddens argues that the democratization of intimacy of 
the past decades has not only strengthened the autonomy of individuals but also the 
plurality of modern societies (Giddens 1992). Similarly, Cohen and Rössler support a 
definition of privacy not in opposition but in correlation to the concept of civil society. 
Referring to the abortion debates, they propose a decisional concept of privacy, 
ensuring the decisional autonomy of individuals over how they want to join the 
sphere of civil society (Cohen 1997; Rössler 2001: 144ff.). The analysis of recent 
privacy legislation confirms this assessment. To keep personal information private 
has become an important condition that individuals are publicly treated as equals and 
can act socially on this democratic basis.  
But it has to be reminded that the effects of the decisional concept of privacy are 
ambivalent. At first sight, the increased autonomy of individuals looks like a civic 
empowerment. But as the case study shows, it also means – in Foucault’s words – 
an increasing “governing of the self”. In practice, the right of informational self-
determination does not mean that the individuals’ privacy is always better protected; 
it can also mean that individuals are facing increasing constraints to voluntarily 
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disclose their personal data. In this sense, the civic empowerment by recent 
legislation in data protection can also be interpreted as a new form of a more 
subjective form of an insurance-related governmentality.  
2. Recent privacy debates also reveal important alliances and cross-fertilizing effects 
between individuals, privacy advocacy groups and state authorities. The case study 
shows that the distinction between social spheres, as the private sphere, civil society 
and the state, should not lead to overlook the interactions between the sectors. 
Following Weingart’s model, we can state that there the process of social 
differentiation is indeed combined with increasing co-dependencies and structural 
couplings, although often in the form of contradictive tensions, between different sub-
systems (Weingart 2001). One important form of these couplings emerged out of the 
relation between civil society and the state. In the 1970s and 1980s, the threats of 
modern technologies to the privacy of individuals became the starting point for 
collective action and for various forms of privacy activism which mainly acted in the 
context of civil society. The main targets of these criticisms were government 
authorities and private corporations. Since the 1980s, privacy debates were marked 
by a strategic situation. With the institutionalization of privacy watchdogs as part of 
state bureaucracies, the political alliances have shifted. Nowadays, most of the 
problems of privacy legislation relate to the private economy. Thus, over the past 
decade, organizations of the private market have replaced the state as the focus of 
privacy debates, and associations and parties supporting privacy proposals 
increasingly cooperated with government authorities. The case illustrates a situation 
rarely reflected in the civil society literature. In a society with particularly strong 
market institutions, the alliance between organizations of the civil society and 
institutions of the state can be an effective way to strengthen the sphere of civil 
society.  
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